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I. INTRODUCTION 
International and internationalized1 criminal tribunals have 
multiple aims. These include not only their core function of trying 
cases, but also other, broader objectives, such as developing the legal 
standards of the field of international criminal law, incentivizing 
states to pursue transitional justice mechanisms, and achieving socio-
political impact in the concerned post-conflict states. While 
international criminal tribunals initially behaved as though achieving 
these other aims might flow naturally from their work on their cases, 
it has since become evident that these objectives require attention in 
and of themselves. In this article, I argue that future internationalized 
criminal tribunals should refocus more of their efforts to pursue these 
goals on a natural conduit with underutilized potential: influencing 
national courts in post-conflict states. Internationalized tribunals 
could exponentially expand the effect of their judgments in post-
conflict societies if national judges in the concerned post-conflict 
states were to regularly consider those judgments and treat them as 
persuasive authority when deciding their own cases. This is the most 
ordinary, well-accepted way that courts influence each other and, 
eventually, society at large: by issuing rulings that are then adopted 
or adapted by other courts. It is thus a core part of internationalized 
tribunals’ role as courts. In so doing, internationalized criminal 
tribunals could become what we might call bellwether2 courts: courts 
1. Throughout this article, I will use the terms “internationalized” and “hybrid” to 
encompass tribunals, courts, and chambers that are established to hear cases of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and that incorporate both 
international and national components. These include both independent courts and 
chambers within national judicial systems. The internationalized/hybrid criminal 
tribunals established thus far include the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East 
Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the War Crimes Chamber of the Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Regulation 64 panels in Kosovo, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the 
Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal. There are also several purely 
international criminal tribunals: the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the 
International Criminal Court, See Beth Van Schaack, The Building Blocks of 
Hybrid Justice, 44 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POLICY 101 (2015).   
 2.  See Bellwether, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2004) (defining 
“bellwether” as used today as “a person or thing that assumes the leadership or 
forefront, as of a profession or industry.” The word “bellwether” derives from the 
word bell and the Middle English word “wether,” which meant a castrated ram. It 
originates in a medieval sheepherding practice: flocks of sheep typically had a 
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who are norm leaders in a particular field, whose reasoning and 
decisions are influential on other tribunals not because they must be 
followed, but because other courts choose to follow them. 
Effectively operationalizing this function is, however, a complex 
task, both conceptually and practically. Internationalized tribunals 
and domestic post-conflict courts have only a very limited formal 
relationship with each other, so that any such mechanism of 
rapprochement  would be entirely voluntary. Internationalized 
criminal tribunals’ cases and the processes by which they are heard 
are highly complex, so that influence on national courts cannot be the 
sole or even the primary consideration in most internal decisions 
concerning case management and judgment. International criminal 
trials and post-conflict legal systems are inevitably attended by 
messy socio-political circumstances that further complicate the 
functioning of the concerned legal institutions and any attempt at 
developing transnational relationships between courts. In addition, 
internationalized criminal tribunals often suffer from a legitimacy 
gap vis-a-vis constituencies in the concerned post-conflict states. 
Finally, internationalized criminal tribunals, like other courts, are 
primarily designed to try cases.3 
Accordingly, I propose that internationalized tribunals could 
expand their engagement with post-conflict national courts in two 
ways. First, internationalized criminal tribunals should do more. 
Future internationalized courts could make relatively minor, discrete 
internal design choices that would make their judgments more 
accessible and useful to national actors trying atrocity cases. This 
would enable a form of transjudicial dialogue4 between national and 
internationalized criminal tribunals that is based in the core function 
of courts as decision-makers and capitalizes on internationalized 
tribunals’ particular expertise and resources. In addition, they should 
target their direct engagement with national courts where it will have 
single wether as their leader, and the shepherd placed a bell around the leading 
wether’s neck to signal the flock’s movement and direction). 
 3.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 4.  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 112-13 (1994-95) (discussing how both types of 
jurisdictions voluntarily communicate and forge a dialogue even though a formal 
procedure regulating the relationship between international and national courts is 
absent). 
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the most impact, in peer-to-peer contacts with judges, prosecutors, 
and other national court actors. 
Internationalized criminal tribunals should also do less. They 
should outsource other aspects of the process of influencing national 
courts through persuasive authority to the extensive rule of law 
networks that operate in post-conflict countries. Such networks can 
offer the benefit of direct contacts with national actors and 
institutions as well as expertise in working with those institutions; 
these networks also have an interest in promoting successful national 
atrocity trials as part of their rule of law agenda. They could also 
make use of their interns and alumni to expand their transnational 
networks in concert with rule of law actors without unduly taxing 
court resources. In this way, internationalized courts could remain 
focused on their area of expertise, trying international criminal law 
cases, while enabling transnational rule of law networks to amplify 
the effects of that work. 
This is an appropriate time to consider these questions, because 
after a period in which it seemed as though ad hoc internationalized 
criminal tribunals were waning, proposals for such tribunals are 
proliferating again.5 The recent success of the Extraordinary African 
Chambers in Senegal in trying Hissène Habré highlights the 
resurgent trend toward ad hoc hybrid institutions.6 The international 
community could make strategic choices in designing this new 
generation of tribunals to maximize their potential influence on 
national courts. 
In this article, I focus solely on internationalized tribunals’ 
relationships with national courts in the concerned post-conflict 
countries. Of course, other national courts may also hear atrocity 
cases by exercising universal jurisdiction or other bases of 
jurisdiction. However, it is through the national courts of the relevant 
post-conflict states that internationalized criminal tribunals can hope 
to produce their desired impact in those states; in addition, 
internationalized tribunals have a different and more complex 
 5.  Van Schaack, supra note 1, at 102 (listing ten pending proposals for new 
tribunals). 
 6.  Dionne Searcey, Hissène Habré, Ex-President of Chad, Is Convicted of 
War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/world/ 
africa/hissene-habre-leader-chad-war-crime. 
 
BAYLIS- THE PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (DO NOT DELETE)2/23/2017  12:27 PM 
2017] PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY  615 
relationship with those national courts by virtue of their direct 
connection to the venue of the atrocities and the attendant socio-
political context. As such, it is appropriate to treat them as a discrete 
case. 
Also, although I use the International Criminal Court (ICC) as an 
example from time to time, and although a proposal for a new 
regional African Criminal Court is pending,7 the suggestions made in 
this article will likely be more effectively implemented by future ad 
hoc tribunals that are focused on the situation in a single country. 
Such tribunals will have greater opportunities for intensive 
engagement with national counterparts, can more readily tailor their 
judgments to national circumstances, and will be able to build 
persuasive components into their structural design choices. 
Part II discusses the nature of the relationships between 
internationalized criminal tribunals and post-conflict national courts 
and the benefits that a more robust engagement centered on 
persuasive authority might provide. Part III explores the 
characteristics that have enabled some courts to extend their 
persuasive authority to other courts not bound to follow their legal 
reasoning. Part IIIA focuses on studies of international court 
influence, while Part IIIB considers how U.S trial courts have used 
specialized bellwether trials to influence other courts on the national 
level. Part IV concludes with discussion of the implications of this 
model. 
II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
INTERNATIONALIZED AND NATIONAL COURTS 
International and internationalized criminal courts share 
jurisdiction with national courts over the international crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, which I will 
refer to collectively as “atrocities.”8 The legal bases for allocation of 
 7.  Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 16, A.U. Doc. No. 
STC/Legal/Min. 7(1) Rev. 1 (May 14, 2014). 
 8.  See Xavier Phillipe, The Principles of Complementarity and Universal 
Jurisdiction: How Do the Two Principles Intermesh? 88 INT’L R. RED CROSS 375, 
377, 379 (2006) (stating that crimes which are grave in nature may be prosecuted 
nationally by states or internationally by international organizations and that such 
universal jurisdiction allows for the trial of international crimes committed by 
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jurisdiction between internationalized and national courts are often 
set forth in the founding statutes of internationalized tribunals.9 In 
practice, irrespective of the formal structure of the shared 
jurisdiction, internationalized tribunals have the resources to hear 
only a few, typically high profile, cases.10 In this regard, these courts 
exist in a potentially synergistic relationship. Internationalized 
tribunals can take on a select set of cases that national courts are 
unable or unwilling to pursue, and national courts provide a response 
to international courts’ limited capacity to hear the many cases that 
arise from conflicts. 
However, although national courts in post-conflict states typically 
have jurisdiction to hear atrocity cases either under national law or 
by applying international law, they do not always do so.11 There are a 
variety of reasons for this, including lack of resources, unfamiliarity 
with international law, and political and social pressure.12 When 
cases are heard, there are sometimes problems in how post-conflict 
national courts handle them, such as neglect or misuse of 
international law, due process lapses, evidentiary gaps, or external 
influence to convict or acquit.13 These impediments are, in fact, one 
anyone anywhere in the world).   
 9.  See generally Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 8, Jan. 16, 
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. (providing for concurrent jurisdiction and assigning 
primacy to the Special Court); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (explaining the legal bases for the 
allocation of jurisdiction) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 10.  See Judgment List, U.N. INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
(Sept. 2016), http://www.icty.org/sid/10095 (demonstrating that a small number of 
cases were heard by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia); see also The Cases, U.N. MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIB. (Sept. 
2016), http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases (showing that the International Criminal 
Tribunals generally hear a few high profile cases); Archive, Residual Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (Sept. 2016), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents (demonstrating 
that the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone heard the case of Charles Taylor, 
the former President of Liberia).  
 11.  See Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Pond: International 
Crimes in National Courts, 90 IND. L.J. 829, 830 (2015) (stating that trials may not 
be possible due to issues such as the lack of available judicial resources). 
 12.  See Keren Michaeli, The Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia on War Crime Investigations and Prosecutions in Croatia, DOMAC 
78-79 (Dec. 2011), http://www.domac.is/media/domac-skjol/Domac-10-KM-
Croatia.pdf (listing the many challenges in hearing atrocity cases at the national 
court level). 
 13.  See Jane E. Stromseth, Justice on the Ground: Can International Criminal 
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of the primary rationales for creating internationalized criminal 
tribunals. We should not, however, establish simple dichotomies 
contrasting national and internationalized tribunals’ capabilities. 
Internationalized tribunals have experienced their own due process 
problems, evidentiary gaps, and accusations of bias.14 
Also, internationalized criminal tribunals are intended not only to 
issue fair judgments in individual criminal prosecutions, but also to 
promote socio-political change in post-conflict societies. This 
includes such ambitious goals as fostering social reconciliation, 
providing a sense of justice for victims, rebuilding trust in rule of 
law, creating a historical record for future generations, and deterring 
further atrocities.15 In practice, internationalized criminal tribunals 
have found progress toward these goals to be distressingly elusive, at 
least in the short-term. Indeed, tribunals (especially international 
tribunals, but also hybrid courts) have found that  domestic audiences 
often regard them as distant, irrelevant, or even unjust.16 
Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies? 1 HAGUE J. 
RULE L. 87, 91 (2009) [hereinafter Stromseth, Justice on the Ground] (recognizing 
that national courts often handle cases in a problematic manner, particularly when 
it comes to accountability and the state of the domestic justice system). 
 14.  See John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heinde, Experiments in International 
Criminal Justice: Lessons from the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
369, 387-88 (2013-2014) (outlining several problems that internationalized 
tribunals have encountered such as methodological failures, biases, a lack of 
transparency, and procedural irregularities); Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and 
Discovery Before the International Criminal Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA 
J. INT’L FOREIGN AFF. 207, 208-09 (2009) (stating that the inability of the 
Prosecutor to disclose exculpatory materials and information material to the 
defense did not allow for a fair trial); contra William Schabas, Prosecutorial 
Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 731, 734-35 (2008) (explaining that the Prosecutor uses three factors 
based on an ICC statute to decide whether to exercise his proprio motu powers) 
[hereinafter Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion]. 
 15.  See James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the 
Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2009) (stating that one goal of the ICC is to prevent grave crimes). 
 16.  See Public Perception in Serbia of the ICTY and the National Courts 
Dealing with War Crimes, OSCE (2009), http://wcjp.unicri.it/proceedings/docs/ 
OSCESrb_ICTY_Perception_in_Serbia.pdf [hereinafter Public Perception] 
(showing that public perception of the ICTY in Serbia is generally negative); see 
also Pham et. al., So We Will Never Forget: A Population-Based Survey on 
Attitudes About Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers of 
Cambodia, HUM. RTS. CTR. U.C. BERKELEY, 3-4 (Jan. 2009), http://hhi. 
harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/so-we-will-never-forget.pdf [hereinafter 
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Internationalized criminal tribunals have increasingly taken proactive 
steps to heighten their positive impact in the affected societies, rather 
than expecting such influence to follow naturally from their trial 
activities. Many of the recent ad hoc tribunals have been organized 
as hybrid courts located within the affected state and staffed with a 
number of domestic judges and lawyers, rather than as international 
tribunals sited elsewhere and staffed almost exclusively with 
international personnel.17 Internationalized tribunals have developed 
outreach programs to publicize and legitimize their work with the 
concerned domestic populations and to assist in the capacity building 
work of NGOs and other rule of law actors.18 
The variety of courts hearing atrocity cases also implicates another 
aim of internationalized criminal tribunals: to develop the field of 
international criminal law, by establishing legal standards, 
procedural rules, methods of investigation and evidence 
development, and so on. Over the last twenty years, the courts 
hearing atrocity cases have proliferated, and so have the standards 
they apply.19 Accordingly, there is also an ongoing debate about the 
degree of legal integration or pluralism that is desirable in 
international criminal law, and about the role of the ICC and other 
Pham et. al., So We Will Never Forget] (demonstrating mixed sentiments regarding 
the role and effects of the ECCC on delivering justice and the overall objectivity 
and integrity of the court); see also Pham et. al., Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in 
Rwanda: Implications for Attitudes Toward Justice and Reconciliation, 292 JAMA 
602, 608, 610 (2004) [hereinafter Pham et. al., Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in 
Rwanda] (showing that those who were educated more possessed negative 
attitudes toward judicial processes, rather than negative ones); see also Peter Uvin 
& Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda, 9 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 219, 220-21 (2003) (stating that Rwandans and the 
Rwandan government maintains a negative attitude towards the ICTR). 
 17.  See Stromseth, Justice on the Ground, supra note 13, at 89 (stating that 
direct participation of national judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and other 
personnel are an advantage of hybrid tribunals). 
 18.  See e.g. JANE STROMSETH, ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING 
THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 263-95 (2006); Outreach 
Programme, U.N. INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.icty.org/sid/242; William A. Schabas, International Criminal 
Tribunals: A Review of 2007, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 382, 414 (2008). 
 19.  See Nancy Combs, Seeking Inconsistency: Advancing Pluralism in 
International Criminal Sentencing, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2016) (elaborating 
on the unfettered sentencing discretion wielded by judges as this proliferation has 
occurred, leading to wide variation in sentences).  
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internationalized tribunals in setting legal standards for the field.20 
This paper does not seek to identify the optimal degree of legal 
integration. Rather, it assumes that some degree of pluralism is 
inevitable, in light of the inability of any one court to impose its legal 
standards on another and the pluralism that has already developed 
among national and international jurisdictions.21 It recognizes the 
value both of legal integration as a means to developing a coherent 
field of law, and of legal pluralism as a mode of tailoring that field to 
particular states’ situations and domestic legal cultures. But in order 
to gain these benefits of integration and pluralism, courts’ decisions 
on whether to adopt shared norms or go their own way should be 
informed and purposeful. 
With these characteristics in mind, this paper begins from a pair of 
interrelated premises concerning the relationships between 
internationalized criminal courts and post-conflict national courts: 
(1) that internationalized tribunals have an interest in playing a 
bellwether role as norm leaders, influencing other courts to adopt 
their standards and setting practices for the field as a whole; and (2) 
that there are benefits in internationalized tribunals playing such a 
role, particularly vis-à-vis national courts in the concerned post-
conflict states. Such national courts are best positioned by virtue of 
location and personal jurisdiction to hear atrocity cases arising from 
their own state’s conflict; however, they are also likely to have 
limited resources and capabilities in the aftermath of the conflict, 
especially in the immediate post-conflict years. Internationalized 
tribunals’ decisions may enable national courts to pursue more 
prosecutions by reducing the obstacles to trying these complex cases. 
Treating internationalized tribunals’ judgments as persuasive 
authority should increase national courts’ facility with international 
law, whether national courts ultimately adopt, adapt, or reject 
internationalized tribunals’ parsing of the relevant law. In addition, a 
national court might be able to adopt the practice of some 
international and hybrid tribunals and take judicial notice of an 
internationalized tribunal’s findings on the core facts of the 
 20.  See id. at 1-2 (stating that debates about pluralism are popular in 
international criminal scholarship, particularly when it comes to international 
criminal sentencing). 
 21.  See id. (noting widespread pluralism in international criminal law). 
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conflict;22 this would enable the national court to avoid expending 
the considerable resources necessary to undertake repeated, large-
scale investigations into those facts. Internationalized court 
judgments may provide guidance on application of due process 
principles, and it could also deflect some socio-political pressure for 
national courts to be able to defer to internationalized tribunals as a 
source of authority for their legal, factual, and evidentiary 
determinations. 
If this inter-court communication becomes a dialogue, the benefits 
could flow both ways. Discussion with national court judges and 
familiarity with national court judgments might help 
internationalized tribunals gain traction on national laws, norms, the 
history of the conflict, and differences in legal culture and social 
expectations about justice processes.23  This is particularly important 
in light of the difficulty internationalized tribunals have often had in 
gaining credibility with national audiences, as noted above. National 
court interpretations of international law may also influence 
internationalized tribunals; this exchange would make the discussion 
of international criminal standards more diverse and robust and could 
ultimately promote a greater degree of uniformity in interpretation of 
international criminal law standards. 
There are, however, three major obstacles to realizing the 
advantages of such an interchange. The first stems from the formal 
relationship between the courts – or, more accurately, the lack 
thereof. National courts do not have to follow internationalized 
tribunals’ findings, nor do international courts have to take account 
of national courts’ judgments. For example, the ICC’s 
 22.  See generally Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice and 
Admission of Evidence, Prosecutor v. Bimba, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-
04-16-PT, Trial Chamber II, Oct. 25, 2005 (taking judicial notice of certain facts); 
Decision on Accused’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Related to 
Count One, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Trial 
Chamber, Jan. 21, 2014 (taking judicial notice of certain facts); see also Ralph 
Mamiya, Taking Judicial Notice of Genocide: The Problematic Law and Policy of 
the Karemera Decision, 25 WISC. INT’L L. J. 1 (2006) (describing the ICTR’s use 
of judicial notice and arguing for international criminal tribunals to take judicial 
notice only of previously adjudicated facts). 
 23.  See Baylis, What Internationals Know: Improving the Effectiveness of 
Post-Conflict Justice Initiatives, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 243, 275-79 
(2015) (describing the utility of national knowledge for international personnel in 
hybrid tribunals). 
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complementarity provisions require it to defer to national courts’ 
prosecutions, but not to consider their legal analysis or fact-finding.24 
Second, this is a non-trivial task, as the relationship between the 
courts is not likely to be uncomplicated or uniformly positive. 
Indeed, the existing relationship between the ICC and some African 
states is affirmatively hostile, as indicated by the recent withdrawals 
of South Africa, Burundi and Gambia from the ICC.25 The final 
obstacle stems from the realities of the conditions of justice systems 
and modes of communication in post-conflict states: many national 
courts simply do not have access to the judgments of 
internationalized criminal tribunals, especially those national 
tribunals that operate in rural areas or in situations of ongoing 
conflict.26  National courts may not issue written judgments, and if 
they do, they may not be widely circulated or may be produced in a 
local language.27 So how can internationalized tribunals persuade 
national courts to follow, or at least consider, their legal and factual 
findings? And in turn, how can national courts participate in the 
transnational development of international criminal law? 
III. WHAT MAKES COURTS INFLUENTIAL? 
In Part A, I will examine the factors identified by studies that have 
examined international court influence, focusing on examples of 
particularly persuasive international courts identified by these 
studies. In Part B, I will explore how national trial courts have 
influenced other domestic courts through bellwether trials in mass 
tort cases in the United States. Each of these examples relates to a 
different aspect of internationalized criminal tribunals’ capacity to 
 24.  See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (explaining the legal bases for the allocation of 
jurisdiction). 
 25.  See Under Fire, ICC Prosecutor Says to Uphold Fight Against Atrocities, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2016, www.nytimes.com/Reuters/2016/11/23/world/ 
Africa/23 Reuters-war crimes-prosecutor.html (discussing withdrawals). 
 26.  See generally Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal 
Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C.L. 
REV. 1, 57-58 (2009) (noting national courts’ lack of access to internationalized 
tribunals’ judgments) [hereinafter Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International 
Criminal Law]. 
 27.  See id. at 30, n.95 (describing the difficulty of obtaining unpublished 
military court judgments in the DRC). 
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influence post-conflict national courts. The identified international 
courts provide an example of how to develop a functional structural 
framework and communicative strategy, while mass tort bellwether 
trials demonstrate how to select cases and direct legal analysis. 
A. INTERNATIONAL COURT INFLUENCE 
Like internationalized criminal tribunals, some other international 
and regional courts have authority only over the cases before them, 
and national courts are not obligated to follow their reasoning in 
future cases. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) can demand compliance with their 
judgments from the parties in their cases, but while they claim some 
erga omnes effect for their judgments, they have no means of 
enforcing that effect and that claim of authority is not universally 
accepted; the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) are similarly situated.28 
However, there are considerable differences in how successful 
these courts are in influencing national courts to treat their decisions 
as persuasive. National courts in Europe frequently follow the 
ECHR’s interpretations of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms when 
considering human rights issues in the cases before them, even 
though they are not legally obligated to do so by the convention 
unless they are party to a case decided by the ECHR on the relevant 
issue.29 The ECHR itself claims status as the authoritative interpreter 
of the convention, and many European states treat it as such, 
although many “do not consider the erga omnes effect of ECHR 
rulings to be a legal requirement.”30 The ECHR is also regularly 
 28.  See Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-
American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 493, 
524 (2011); see also Laurence R. Helfer and Karen J. Alter, The Andean Tribunal 
of Justice and its Interlocutors: Understanding Preliminary Reference Patterns in 
the Andean Community, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 871, 876 (2008). 
 29.  See TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 86 (2003) 
(stating that under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, member states are obligated to comply with the 
ECHR’s judgments in the cases it decides, but the Convention does not create an 
obligation for national courts to adopt the ECHR’s interpretation of the Convention 
in their own cases). 
 30.  Laurence R. Helfer, The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators, in 
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cited by courts outside Europe addressing human rights issues, and it 
is generally regarded as the most successful regional human rights 
court.31 Likewise, the ECJ has succeeded in gradually gaining 
credibility with the national courts in its jurisdiction. In contrast, 
other regional courts have struggled to gain acceptance by the 
national courts in their jurisdiction or have found the extent of their 
influence to be more limited. The IACHR rarely achieves even direct 
compliance with its rulings from national judicial actors.32 Similarly, 
the ATJ has a stronger relationship with certain administrative 
agencies than with national courts.33 As discussed below, this seems 
to be in part due to differences in structure or strategy by the 
international courts, and partly due to differences in national politics 
and other external circumstances. All told, the characteristics of the 
ECHR and its counterparts suggest a path for internationalized 
criminal courts seeking to extend their influence with the relevant 
domestic courts. 
There is a growing body of scholarship addressing international 
courts’ persuasive influence on national courts. Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and Melissa Waters have described modes of transnational 
judicial dialogue that enable national and international courts to 
extend their influence with each other, such as cross-citation.34 Many 
scholars have focused on the narrower issue of national compliance 
with international court judgments in individual cases, which 
encompasses but is not limited to the role of national courts; for 
example, Alexandra Huneeus has studied national courts’ 
compliance with IACHR judgments,35 and Anne-Marie Slaughter 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 464, 472 (Cesare P. 
R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014).  
 31.  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
1103, 1109-11 (1999-2000) (using examples from South Africa, Zimbabwe, and 
Jamaica). 
 32.  See Huneeus, supra note 28, at 494 (finding that Latin American 
prosecutors and judges rarely comply with Inter-American Court rulings requiring 
their action). 
 33.  See Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 876 (finding that administrative 
agencies act as stronger compliance constituencies for the ATJ than national 
courts). 
 34.  See Slaughter, supra note 4, at 101-102; Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms 
and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and 
Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L. J. 487, 492-531 (2005). 
 35.  See Huneeus, supra note 37, at 494 (concluding that national courts often 
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and Laurence Helfer have examined national institutions’ 
compliance with ECHR and ECJ rulings.36 More expansively, Karen 
Alter writes about the role of international courts’ national 
“compliance constituencies” in promoting their influence; she 
defines compliance broadly to include not only literal compliance 
with judgments but also adoption and implementation of an 
international court’s legal standards by its national counterparts 
across all cases and situations.37 Laurence Helfer has broken down 
international courts’ influence into several categories, including not 
only compliance-oriented forms of effectiveness but also, 
“embeddedness effectiveness,” i.e., “whether ICs [international 
courts] are effective in embedding international law and international 
judicial rulings in national legal orders,”38 and “effectiveness in 
developing international law” which comprises all manner of norm-
generating functions including transnational judicial dialogue.39 
Similarly Helfer, Alter, and Madsen have produced a framework for 
analyzing international courts’ authority that includes their 
“intermediate legal authority” to persuade compliance partners “to 
comply with international law as interpreted by the IC” generally, 
and their “extensive authority” to “consistently shape law and 
politics” in their field, in addition to their “narrow authority” to 
ensure compliance in a particular case.40 
These studies have identified factors that shape the relationships 
between international and national courts. They focus primarily on 
international courts’ influence on national courts and other national 
institutions; to a lesser extent, they identify modes of influence by 
national judges and other national actors on international courts. 
fail to comply with Inter-American Court rulings and suggesting several courses of 
actions to remedy the issue). 
 36.  Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 276 (1997) (finding that the ECJ 
and ECHR have managed to create an effective strategy that makes their decisions 
as effective as national court rulings). 
 37.  See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS, 5, 21-22 (2014).  
 38.  Helfer, supra note 30, at 474.  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How 
Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
1, 10-11 (2016) (examining how these metrics of compliance help determine the 
actual power that an international court wields). 
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Each study focuses on a different aspect of international-national 
engagement, identifies a somewhat different set of factors and 
categorizes those factors in different ways. I focus here on 
components that seem particularly salient in the context of ad hoc 
internationalized tribunals and their relationships to their national 
counterparts in post-conflict states. These factors fall into five 
interrelated categories: structural/institutional characteristics of the 
international courts; political dynamics; convergence with national 
courts’ interests; development of transnational networks; and the 
utility and availability of the international courts’ opinions.41 
1. Structural/Institutional Characteristics 
In their theory of supranational adjudication, Helfer and Slaughter 
identify several structural elements that contribute to the 
effectiveness of an international tribunal on the national level by 
enhancing the perceived legitimacy and capability of the 
international tribunal.42 Of particular relevance for internationalized 
criminal tribunals, these include judges who are recognized as skilled 
experts and the capacity to effectively manage a high caseload of 
significant cases; the ECHR, for example, has benefitted from the 
recognized skill and expertise of its judges and its capacity to 
efficiently manage a steady stream of high profile cases, although it 
has in recent years developed a problematic backlog.43 For the 
internationalized criminal tribunals, these are two persistent 
structural problem areas. Internationalized tribunals have proceeded 
slowly with their cases, and this has affected their credibility in the 
concerned post-conflict states.44 As for hiring expert judges, while 
 41.  See Alter, Helfer, & Madsen, supra note 40, at 10; Huneeus, supra note 
28, at 524; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 285 (exploring individually 
separate factors that impact the influence and clout international courts have on 
national courts); see generally Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 911-12 
(explaining, as an example, the relationship between national courts and the 
Andean Tribunal of Justice in the context of IP litigation). 
 42.  See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 300-36 (expounding 
on these elements that include, but are not limited to, the composition of the court, 
caseload, quality of reasoning, the subject-matter, and the formal authority the 
tribunal operates under, among other things).  
 43.  See id.; Helfer, supra note 30, at 472 (documenting a backlog of pending 
applications at the ECHR). 
 44.  See Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
79, 81 (2009) (describing the slow pace of ICTR and ICTY proceedings and the 
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the ICC has access to many highly qualified candidates for judicial 
positions, hybrid courts have historically struggled to hire judges 
who are experts in international criminal law to work in the post-
conflict settings where hybrid courts are based.45 
In their framework for analyzing the effectiveness of international 
tribunals, Alter, Helfer, and Madsen identify additional structural 
components that incentivize national actors to engage with an 
international court, such as its accessibility to non-state actor litigants 
to bring claims and the extent to which the subject matter is technical 
rather than political; neither of these factors favor successful 
engagement by internationalized criminal tribunals, due to the 
inherently prosecutorial and political nature of the courts’ work.46 
However, structure alone is not determinative. The ATJ is closely 
modeled on the ECJ structurally but has a more limited degree of 
influence on the national courts within its purview due to the impact 
of other factors, discussed below.47 
2. Political Dynamics 
Political pressures can play several different roles. First, there is 
the role of politics in the relationship between the international court 
and the political branches of the national government. The ICC has 
been perceived as targeting African states as the subject of its 
investigations and as basing its selection of defendants at least in part 
on political considerations, and this has led to an increasingly tense 
relationship between the court and the concerned national 
governments in that region.48 The examples of the IACHR and the 
ATJ also affirm the role of political dynamics; the ATJ’s sphere of 
negative reaction from victims and others, but ultimately concluding that the speed 
is not dissimilar to that of other complex cases). 
 45.  Elena Baylis, What Internationals Know: Improving the Effectiveness of 
Post-Conflict Justice Initiatives, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 243, 281-282 
(2015). 
 46.  See Alter, Helfer, & Madsen, supra note 40, at 17-22 (classifying these 
context factors into three distinct analytical categories: institution specific context; 
constituencies context; and global, regional, and local political context).  
 47.  See Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 875-76. 
 48.  See Leslie Vinjamuri, The International Criminal Court and the Paradox 
of Authority, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 282-86 (2016) (elaborating on the 
difficulties that individual domestic politics can create as international criminal 
courts attempt to work collectively towards a single common goal). 
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influence has been considerably narrower than its jurisdiction due in 
part to lack of sufficient national political support, while the IACHR 
has faced resistance from some national constituents.49 
Second, there are the political dynamics surrounding the subject 
matter of the legal issue. For example, some South American 
administrative agencies have found that referring cases to the 
Andean Tribunal insulates them from internal political pressure on 
the intellectual property matters within their jurisdiction.50 Most 
atrocity trials concern actors who are deeply entangled in the politics 
of their states and in the quest for peace and reconciliation in the 
wake of devastating conflicts, so political pressures surrounding 
these trials tend to be extremely high. Depending on the 
circumstances, this can produce varying relationships with 
internationalized criminal tribunals. The government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), for example, was 
perceived as using its ICC referral to target its political enemies; in 
contrast, Uhuru Kenyatta used his ICC indictment as a campaigning 
point in his favor in winning election as President of Kenya.51 
Finally, there may be civil society advocacy networks promoting 
engagement or disengagement with the international court and/or 
particular results on the merits. This played an important role in the 
ECJ context; similarly, the ECHR has benefitted from a movement 
towards integration in Europe and from the development of regional 
institutions and the dynamics that foster participation in its regime.52 
Of course, the significance of political pressure will also vary 
according to the degree of independence of the national courts. 
3. National Courts’ Interests 
When national courts are not required to engage with international 
courts or apply international legal standards, they will tend to do so 
when it serves their own interests. One such interest is in expanding 
their own power. The ECJ referral system enables national courts to 
exercise power by giving them control over which cases to refer, 
 49.  See Huneeus, supra note 34; Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 875-76. 
 50.  See Helfer, supra note 30, at 475. 
 51.  See generally James Verini, The Prosecutor and The President, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2016, at MM44 (detailing the rise of Kenyatta and postelection 
violence in Kenya). 
 52.  See Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 927. 
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allowing them to gain judicial review over the executive and 
legislative branches, and permitting lower level national courts to 
indirectly challenge higher national court rules.53 If an 
internationalized criminal tribunal’s work enables national courts to 
expand their authority over atrocity cases and thereby gain power 
vis-à-vis national institutions, this may encourage national courts to 
adopt international rulings as persuasive authority. However, in some 
particularly fraught post-conflict contexts, such expansion of 
authority may be too risky to appeal to national judges and 
prosecutors. 
National courts also gain some reputational benefit when 
international courts cite their decisions with approval, another 
practice of the ECHR and the ECJ.54 Within its decisions, the ECHR 
has affirmed and legitimized national courts’ domestic authority by 
deferring to national courts through the margin of appreciation 
doctrine and by citing conforming national court opinions. Similarly, 
the ECJ deliberately developed its collaboration with national courts 
by deferring to their authority within their jurisdiction, while 
simultaneously appealing to them to proactively fulfill their 
obligations to enforce European Community law – and to do so 
based on the ECJ’s interpretations of that law.55 In so doing, the 
European courts enlisted national courts as partners with a common 
goal of enforcing international law. 
Of course, internationalized criminal tribunals are not responding 
to national court decisions and questions as the ECHR and the ECJ 
are; however, they can nonetheless cite applicable national court 
decisions where appropriate, as the ECHR and ECJ have done. 
Making an effort to positively cite national court opinions would 
require internationalized criminal court actors to seek greater 
familiarity with national jurisprudence, which would in turn serve the 
ultimate goal of fostering a transnational dialogue about the 
developing standards of international criminal law. In addition, 
 53.  See id., at 892-93, 924-25; see also Huneeus, supra note 28, at 515-16 
(noting that while direct review of national courts is possible, the ECJ mostly 
refrains from utilizing it). 
 54.   See Huneeus, supra note 28, at 525 (suggesting that doing so in certain 
spheres helps compensate for the greater accountability that the Inter-American 
Court demands from national courts in others). 
 55.  See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 309-10. 
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internationalized criminal tribunals would benefit from learning from 
their national counterparts about the factual situation, national legal 
standards, and national legal culture. Internationalized criminal 
tribunals are often criticized for their lack of a deep understanding of 
the situations they are investigating, and greater exchange with 
national counterparts could facilitate greater conversance with the 
circumstances.56 Particularly in countries where judgments are not 
regularly published, this would also require partnering with rule of 
law actors in the relevant country to gain access to the national 
judgments and/or engaging directly with national judges, as 
discussed in the following section. 
Another national interest is in attaining guidance and clarification 
on particular substantive issues, thereby making it easier to 
adjudicate related cases. As such, the content and the technicality of 
opinions both matter, as discussed further below.57 Finally, 
depending on the circumstances, relying on the standards propagated 
by an international court may insulate a national court from political 
pressures, as noted above; however, identifying with international 
institutions can also bring political risks. 
4. Transnational Networks 
While citations and analysis in judgments are a key way that 
courts communicate, internationalized tribunals wishing to initiate a 
sustained, influential relationship with national courts will need to 
put considerable resources into other connections with those courts. 
This may come in the form of individual meetings, social gatherings, 
organized bar associations, or other modes of interaction. Especially 
in its early days, the ECJ put a great deal of effort into proactively 
courting national court judges, plying them with visits, seminars and 
dinners that informed national court judges about the ECJ in pleasant 
 56.  See Baylis, supra note 45, at 245-248 (asserting that international attorneys 
working in hybrid tribunals with national counterparts self-reported a more 
sophisticated understanding of the national circumstances than those working in 
purely international tribunals). 
 57.  See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 309-11 (explaining that both the 
ECJ and the ECHR have fashioned their opinions to reach beyond the parties in the 
case and provide guidance for national courts and relevant state actors); see also 
Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 924-25 (arguing that the real power of the ECJ 
lies in the cooperation of the national judiciaries, meaning that opinions often 
reach beyond the parties in the ECJ). 
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environments.58 
It is particularly important for internationalized criminal tribunals 
to form transnational networks with their national counterparts due to 
their attenuated and at times contentious relationships with the 
concerned states. Certainly, internationalized criminal tribunals have 
been increasingly committed to outreach to their national 
constituencies and capacity building aimed at local courts.59 
However, much of this work has remained focused on the general 
public and contact with national judges appear to have been centered 
primarily on capacity building rather than dialogue over legal 
standards and norms.60 Optimally, peer-to-peer connections with 
national counterparts should be one of the first tasks of any 
internationalized criminal court. These early contacts provide the 
basis for a relationship of trust that can enable eventual dialogue and 
debate over the substance of internationalized court decisions and 
their applicability in national court settings.61 
Apart from these direct peer-to-peer contacts, internationalized 
tribunals will want to rely on rule of law networks for other 
connections. International rule of law actors maintain relationships 
with national institutions as a core part of their work and maintain 
extensive, active networks in post-conflict countries. Such networks 
are important for building trust, sharing information, and facilitating 
cross citation and cross fertilization of legal norms. Such networks 
are also a primary mode of sharing judicial opinions across national 
boundaries, even if such opinions are already publicly available.62 
 58.  See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 301-02. 
 59.  See Outreach: Capacity Building, U.N. INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/capacity-building (citing 
the example of the ITCY in launching its outreach section in 1999 and partnering 
with the OSCE/ODIHR to transfer expertise to courts in the former Yugoslavia 
through its war crimes justice project). 
 60.  See Baylis, supra note 26, at 1 (noting that the ICC’s early approach to 
outreach in the DRC, for example, was focused on generally publicizing the 
court’s work through the news media and through informational sessions provided 
by ICC outreach staff for national court judges and attorneys). 
 61.  See Baylis, supra note 62, at 625.  
 62.  See Elena Baylis, Function and Dysfunction in Post-Conflict Justice 
Networks and Communities, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 625, 661 (2014) 
(focusing on how the communication of international staff from these courts helps 
establish prevailing norms and practices in the international tribunal community); 
see also Alter, Helfer, & Madsen, supra note 40, at 29-30; Huneeus, supra note 28, 
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In addition to using transnational rule of law networks, 
internationalized criminal tribunals could conserve their personnel 
resources by deploying interns and alumni to work with national 
courts on their behalf. With several of the ad hoc tribunals shutting 
down, there is a surfeit of experienced attorneys and other court 
personnel who would serve as experts for post-conflict national 
courts.63 In addition, there is already a transnational network of 
interns among the existing international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals.64 These interns often have detailed knowledge of 
the intricacies of particular cases for which they have conducted 
research and frequently have experience at several tribunals through 
successive internships. Both national and internationalized courts 
could benefit by establishing an intern circuit between an 
internationalized court and its counterpart domestic courts that could 
transfer information about cases and judgments between the two.65 
5. Utility and Availability of Opinions 
The utility and availability of international courts’ opinions is not 
a given. To be useful to a national court, an opinion must be on a 
topic of relevance, addressing the national court’s fact situation in a 
manner that the national court can readily implement, and must be 
sufficiently technical and apolitical for a national court to refer to it 
without fear of political retribution. Finally, the content of judgments 
is critical. Slaughter and Helfer emphasize the importance of “[a]n 
opinion that systematically canvasses the arguments for and against a 
particular position, approving some and answering or rejecting 
others,” thereby achieving “the recognition, albeit not the 
reconciliation, of competing social, political, and economic 
values.”66 This approach is particularly critical for internationalized 
at 529-30; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 309-12, 323-26 (affirming the 
importance of “awareness of audience” and “cross fertilization and dialogue”).  
 63.  Judge Vagn Joensen, Address to the United Nations Security Council: 
Final Report on the Completion Strategy of the Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(Sep. 9, 2015) (transcript available in United Nations Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunal).  
 64.  See Baylis, supra note 62, at 661; Baylis, supra note 45, at 281-282. 
 65.  See Baylis, supra note 62, at 661; Baylis, supra note 45, at 281-282. 
 66.  See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 321-22 (suggesting that this 
method is particularly vital for atrocity cases in which horrific violence between 
social and political groups is at the heart of the legal confrontation because the 
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courts trying to serve as norm leaders for national courts, for it 
provides the information necessary for national courts to assess and 
either apply, reject, or adapt the international courts’ reasoning. 
Fortunately, international courts typically offer a thorough review of 
the arguments and evidence produced by each side as part of their 
ordinary practice. 
Other theories of international court influence emphasize the 
importance of another aspect of the content of the decision. The 
opinion must serve national courts’ interests by addressing a legal 
topic of importance to them in a way that enables them to more 
easily address such cases in their own docket. For example, the ATJ 
has found that its primary area of influence is IP law, because the 
relevant administrative agencies have gained value from seeking 
clarification on vague provisions within their own international 
law.67 As discussed in the next section on national bellwether trials, 
internationalized tribunals could select their cases and organize their 
arguments to be of particular use to national courts hearing cases 
concerning the same issues or fact settings. 
These opinions must also be accessible. Depending on the national 
context, this may mean more than simply publicly issuing the 
opinion. Rather, it must be available in an appropriate language, and 
the national court must be aware of the opinion and its relevance. In 
direct compliance situations, these issues are less salient, because the 
parties will be notified of the judgement. But they are quite important 
where an international court is looking to extend its influence so that 
its opinions are important not merely to the case at hand but also to 
the national system generally.68 It is this level of availability that is 
best promoted through transnational networks of one kind or 
another.69 
method recognizes the losing arguments as legitimate and “signal[s] the 
proponents of these arguments that they have been heard and recognized as 
important participants in a debate, participants whose arguments must be 
answered”). 
 67.  Laurence R Helfer and Karen J Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and 
its Interlocutors: Understanding Preliminary Reference Patters in the Andean 
Community, 41 J. INT’L L. & POL. 871,875-76 (2009). 
 68.  See Alter, Helfer, & Madsen, supra note 40, at 29-30 (noting that 
international judges often write their opinions for a greater audience with an eye to 
impacting the context in which they operate). 
 69.  See Baylis, supra note 26, at 7 (suggesting that transnational networks 
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In post-conflict settings where information can be extraordinarily 
hard to come by and where the internationalized court is frequently 
working in a different language than the national courts, these issues 
of access are paramount. The European courts make their judgments 
quickly available in a variety of languages,70 and the 
internationalized tribunals need to do the same. The ICC has 
developed an online case matrix database and a set of legal tools with 
the aim of making available court documents and judgments from the 
ICC, other internationalized tribunals, and national jurisdictions.71 
The NGO Case Matrix Network (CMN) has extended this project to 
tailor the software and other tools for selected national jurisdictions, 
including the DRC and Colombia among others.72 This is a valuable 
step towards increasing accessibility for domestic courts, particularly 
because availability at the court, or even on the Internet, does not in 
itself ensure ready access in post-conflict settings, where legal actors 
may have no means of obtaining foreign and international judgments, 
or even of knowing they have been issued. What is called for is not 
merely making judgments passively available, but acting to place 
them in the hands of national court attorneys and judges. For this 
purpose, these sorts of partnerships between courts and NGOs enable 
courts to extend accessibility without diverting substantial internal 
resources from their primary purpose of trying cases. In addition to 
partnering with individual NGOs, as the ICC has done with the 
CMN, internationalized criminal tribunals can also make use of 
existing rule of law networks which have expertise in such projects.73 
All in all, studies of international court effectiveness identify a 
number of characteristics that are fundamental for internationalized 
criminal tribunals with aspirations to influence post-conflict national 
promote the goals of post-conflict justice and rebuilding national justice system by 
facilitating and encouraging communication between international and domestic 
courts); see also Huneeus, supra note 28, at 529-30 (advising international courts 
to use their connections within the international legal community to communicate 
and establish bonds and relationships to foment change); Helfer & Slaughter, supra 
note 36, at 309-12, 323-26. 
 70.  Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 301-02. 
 71.  The ICC Case Matrix, CASE MATRIX NETWORK, http://www.casematrix 
network.org/icc-case-matrix/. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Baylis, supra note 26, at 60 (elaborating on the theories regarding the 
advantages of transnational networks, specifically highlighting how effective these 
networks can be as law-conveying tools). 
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courts. First, internationalized tribunals must put in place the basic 
structural elements necessary to establish the reputation and 
credibility of the court. In addition, the requisite political conditions 
must exist; though often this is not within the control of the 
international tribunal, the international community could take 
account of this factor in determining whether to establish an ad hoc 
tribunal for a particular situation. Courts must also undertake a wide 
range of communicative strategies at every stage of the court’s work 
to develop relationships with national courts, rather than simply 
producing judgments and letting national courts make of them what 
they may. In this regard, three mechanisms appear to be particularly 
critical: cultivating national courts’ interests in engaging with 
international legal standards; fostering connections with counterparts 
in national courts and making use of transnational networks; and 
assuring that international decisions are both useful and accessible to 
national courts. 
B. U.S. BELLWETHER TRIALS IN MASS TORT CASES 
While studies of international courts identify the potential 
structural, political, and communicative components of a persuasive 
internationalized criminal tribunal, a U.S. national court practice 
suggests considerations for selecting cases and for organizing 
analysis in judgments. Bellwether trials are an innovation of U.S. 
courts to deal with mass tort cases: a court selects a leading case 
from a set of related mass tort claims and hears that case before it or 
any other court proceeds with any of the other correlated cases.74 The 
purpose of the bellwether trial is to establish the legal and factual 
findings that set the trend for all the associated cases, as well as 
providing a sense of the case’s monetary value, if any. These rulings 
bind only the parties to the bellwether case and are merely advisory 
for the parties to the remaining cases, unless those parties have 
agreed in advance to binding bellwether trials.75 By providing 
 74.  See Manual for Complex Litigation, FED. JUD. CTR., § 22.315 (4th ed. 
2004) (“to obtain the most representative cases from the available pool, a judge 
should direct the parties to select test cases randomly or limit the selection to cases 
that the parties agree are typical of the mix of cases”).  
 75.  See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1998) (where 
the court tried 160 random cases and applied those results to over 2800 related 
cases in the same class-action for exposure to asbestos).  
 
BAYLIS- THE PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (DO NOT DELETE)2/23/2017  12:27 PM 
2017] PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY  635 
persuasive authority on the shared legal and factual issues and a data 
point on the amount of damages, bellwether trials reduce the burden 
on the courts hearing the remaining cases and facilitate settlement or 
mini-trials on individual issues to resolve the remaining claims.76 
Bellwether trials have been held, with varying success, in mass tort 
cases concerning harms allegedly caused by prescription drugs, 
asbestos, and other products.77 Of course, so long as the bellwether 
trial is advisory, other plaintiffs can relitigate the decided issues, and 
other trial courts will not be obligated to follow its rulings, so the 
aspiring bellwether court must design its case selection, trial process, 
and judgment to persuade plaintiffs and other courts to follow its 
lead. 
Mass tort bellwether cases offer a different line of sight on the 
persuasive authority of internationalized tribunals. Unlike the ECHR 
and other international courts, U.S. trial courts do not share many 
structural or institutional similarities with internationalized tribunals. 
However, there are three critical similarities between mass torts and 
the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes. The sheer numbers involved frequently make it 
impossible to try all the cases. Further, these numbers and the nature 
of the acts and injuries also create enormous evidentiary and legal 
complexity for courts hearing the cases. Finally, both mass torts and 
atrocities as legal constructs are made up of common and individual 
elements, that is, some of the matters that must be proved are shared 
amongst a number of related cases, and others are individual to each 
litigant. It is these similarities – and the maneuverings of trial courts 
aiming to persuade other trial courts hearing similar cases – that 
make mass tort bellwether trials an interesting point of comparison. 
Thus, in both mass tort and atrocity situations, a large number of 
people have typically been injured, often in a bewildering variety of 
times, places, and manners, making investigation and proof of facts 
resource-intensive and difficult.78 Both settings also frequently 
 76.  See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 74, §§ 22.312-14. 
 77.  See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d. 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (featuring a 
consolidation of over 3,000 asbestos claims into a single products liability action); 
see also In re Vioxx Litig., No. 619 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. May 12, 2004) 
(concerning a class-action suit against a pharmaceutical company for the 
manufacture and distribution of a drug linked with adverse side-effects). 
 78.  See In re Fibreboard Corp., at 706-07, 712 (acknowledging the extreme 
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present difficult and previously undecided legal issues that require 
considerable court time and attention. In the atrocity context, it is 
prosecutors who choose which cases they will pursue with the 
limited resources of their offices, and so it is they who must deal 
with these problems of numbers and complexity. For post-conflict 
national courts, even individual atrocity cases may represent an 
enormous burden. In the mass tort context, where plaintiffs are in 
control of the numbers and types of cases that are brought and there 
are innumerable plaintiffs’ attorneys ready to take their cases, it is 
the courts that must take on the role of selection. Bellwether trials 
operate in part as a streamlining mechanism: by adopting legal 
analysis and findings of facts from the bellwether case, courts can 
dramatically reduce the difficulty and resource-intensive nature of 
hearing a mass tort or an atrocity case. 
The other fundamental similarity between mass torts and atrocities 
is that in both settings, there are some common legal and factual 
issues that are susceptible of general determination. For example, 
one relatively small set of twenty-two tort cases concerned the spread 
of Legionnaire’s disease on a cruise ship by malfunctioning spa 
filters.79 A bellwether trial determined the common legal and factual 
questions, including the defective condition of the filters, the 
defendant’s responsibility for those defects, and the appropriate 
amount of punitive damages.80 The issues of proximate cause and 
compensatory damages were individual questions that had to be 
decided on a case by case basis. Following the bellwether trial, some 
plaintiffs went forward with mini-trials on the individual issues while 
adopting the bellwether decision as to the common issues; others 
settled their claims.81 
Similarly, in international criminal cases, there are legal questions 
that are relevant to many cases, such as the standard for joint 
difficulty and inherent imperfection in the court trying to handle mass torts). 
 79.  Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(resulting in a claim for products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty that 
garnered millions of dollars in damages). 
 80.  Id. (affirming that a punitive damages judgment of over 4 million dollars 
was reasonable). 
 81.  See id. (Noting that while typically bellwether findings are advisory, in this 
case the plaintiffs had agreed in advance that the bellwether court’s determinations 
on common issues would be binding).  
 
BAYLIS- THE PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (DO NOT DELETE)2/23/2017  12:27 PM 
2017] PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY  637 
criminal enterprise liability, as well as factual questions that are 
common to a related set of cases, such as whether a particular series 
of attacks on civilians occurred and if so, how large and organized 
they were. By addressing these shared legal and factual questions for 
an interrelated set of cases, internationalized tribunals could create 
persuasive authority on which national courts could choose to rely, 
reducing their own investigative and analytic burdens. Of course, 
courts hearing atrocity cases can already cite each other’s legal 
analysis if they wish, and some ad hoc tribunals take judicial notice 
of previously adjudicated facts in other cases before the same court, a 
practice that could potentially be extended to an ad hoc international 
tribunal and national courts hearing cases concerning the same 
conflict.82 What the U.S. bellwether trials demonstrate is how to 
optimize the relevance and utility of the internationalized tribunal’s 
case selection and judgments, so that national courts will be more 
inclined to apply its determinations. 
Three overarching issues have proven particularly salient in mass 
tort trials: whether the bellwether cases are sufficiently representative 
of the cases national courts will hear; whether the legal and factual 
issues decided in the bellwether trials are common to the other cases; 
and whether it is fair to the litigants for another court to adopt the 
bellwether court’s legal and factual findings.83 The bellwether trial 
model suggests that to maximize internationalized tribunals’ utility 
for national courts, such tribunals should (1) select cases that offer 
significant factual and legal commonalities with a number of related 
 82.  See generally Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice and 
Admission of Evidence, Prosecutor v. Bimba, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-
04-16-PT, Trial Chamber II, Oct. 25, 2005 (taking judicial notice of certain facts); 
Decision on Accused’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Related to 
Count One, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Trial 
Chamber, Jan. 21, 2014 (taking judicial notice of certain facts); Ralph Mamiya, 
Taking Judicial Notice of Genocide: The Problematic Law and Policy of the 
Karemera Decision, 25 WISC. INT’L L. J. 1 (2006) (describing the ICTR’s use of 
judicial notice and arguing for international criminal tribunals to take judicial 
notice only of previously adjudicated facts). 
 83.  See Dodge v. Cotter Group, 203 F.3d 1190, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(grappling with each of these issues in turn during complex litigation involving 
claims against a uranium mill and the subsequent contamination and pollution it 
caused in Colorado); see also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., at 300-01 (highlighting 
the court’s struggle to balance the ease of mass litigation with 7th amendment 
concerns regarding the rights of individual litigants). 
 
BAYLIS- THE PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (DO NOT DELETE)2/23/2017  12:27 PM 
638 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:3 
cases; and (2) issue judgments that seek to elucidate those 
commonalities, bearing in mind the three overarching issues 
mentioned above. In particular, concerns with fairness require that an 
internationalized court’s persuasive determinations remain truly 
advisory for future cases and that national courts affirmatively 
evaluate the question of fairness in determining whether to adopt the 
internationalized court’s legal reasoning or take judicial notice of its 
factual findings. 
1. Case Selection 
To optimize the bellwether trial model, defendants should be 
selected for the representativeness of their factual and legal claims, 
so that the internationalized court can take a leading role in deciding 
the common factual issues and legal questions that are likely to arise 
in cases that the national courts may hear. Thus, the prosecutor might 
select a defendant who orchestrated a particular massacre in part 
because the immediate perpetrators are already in domestic custody 
or at least are of known identity and whereabouts. Such a trial would 
give the court an opportunity to investigate and determine the 
common facts on which the national court might then choose to rely. 
Alternatively, the prosecutor might select a defendant and charges 
whose factual connection to other cases was more attenuated, but 
whose case offered the opportunity to address critical common legal 
issues, such as whether a conflict should be treated as international or 
non-international, or whether certain types of militia activity against 
civilians could be considered widespread or systematic enough to 
qualify as a crime against humanity. Optimally, the prosecutor would 
select defendants and charges that would allow for the determination 
of multiple common factual and legal issues that would be of use to 
the national courts. In so doing, the internationalized tribunal would 
promote the purpose of encouraging and enabling national courts to 
take on atrocity prosecutions. Most importantly, this approach has 
the potential to have an impact beyond the immediate impression it 
leaves on the public, through its influence on national trials. 
To date, internationalized tribunals have focused on other criteria 
for case selection, such as prosecuting defendants in prominent 
leadership positions, and having representation of all the groups 
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involved in the conflict amongst the selected defendants.84 The 
proposed focus on representativeness would not supplant other 
prerequisites for prosecution, but rather, could be used in addition to 
those standards. These other characteristics that might be totally 
commensurate with seeking out representative cases in certain 
situations and not at all in others, depending on the socio-political 
setting of the concerned post-conflict state. Where these interests are 
in conflict, prosecutors would have to balance them in determining 
which cases to pursue. 
In this regard, adding a representativeness criterion would also 
have the advantage of providing an additional, principled mechanism 
for choosing cases to prosecute. While the factors that have been 
deployed to date are useful for creating a pool of cases that meet 
minimum admissibility criteria, they are ultimately indeterminate and 
thus permit unexplained, and perhaps inexplicable, exercise of 
discretion in case selection.85 A bellwether trial approach might 
produce a more determinative pattern of prosecutions if it enables 
prosecutors to purposefully narrow the set of potential cases that is 
created by applying the current case selection criteria. 
2. Investigation and Legal Analysis 
As noted above, one of the similarities between mass torts and 
mass atrocities is the existence of certain shared legal elements 
amongst related claims, which in turn require certain common facts 
to be established. Specifically, there are two conjunctive aspects to 
proving mass atrocity crimes: proving the broader context and 
proving the individual’s action and association with that context.86 
For example, to prove that a defendant committed a crime against 
humanity, it is necessary to prove both that the defendant committed 
one of a list of forbidden acts (murder, rape, etc.) and that his act had 
a nexus to a widespread or organized attack on civilians. While the 
 84.  S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503, 
S/RES/1503, (28 Aug 2003); Schabas, International Criminal Tribunals: A Review 
of 2007, supra note 18, at 387.  
 85.  See Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 14, at 736 (claiming that 
prosecutorial discretion is often “ill-defined and complex,” using the problems 
present in the Lubanga case as an example).  
 86.  Cherif Bassiouni, Genocide: The Convention, Domestic Laws, and State 
Responsibility: Remark, 83 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 314, 322 (1989). 
 
BAYLIS- THE PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (DO NOT DELETE)2/23/2017  12:27 PM 
640 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:3 
question of the defendant’s act and its nexus to the attack will be 
individual to each case or perhaps to a few cases stemming from the 
same act, the existence of the attack and its widespread or organized 
character are questions common to all the cases relating to that 
attack. Similarly, in war crimes cases the defendant’s act must be 
related to either an international or non-international armed conflict, 
and to prove genocide the prosecutor must demonstrate that the 
defendant’s act was done with the intent of destroying a listed group 
in whole or in part, a question that typically involves reference to a 
group or government’s plan of destruction.87 
Accordingly, as in mass torts, well-chosen bellwether trials present 
an opportunity to resolve – or at least, to suggest a resolution for – 
these common facts and legal determinations rather than retrying 
them in case after case. As for the individual elements, as in the mass 
torts context, bellwether trials can serve a useful benchmark 
function. This is particularly important in the atrocities context, 
because national post-conflict justice systems frequently lack the 
human, technical, and monetary resources to resolve these large-
scale, complex legal and factual issues.88 However, they may well 
possess the capacity to investigate and decide individual cases once 
the broader factual and legal context has been established. Thus, in 
addition to providing criteria for case selection, an atrocity 
bellwether trial would provide an opportunity to allocate the 
obligation to deploy the funds and other means necessary to deal 
with factual and legal complexity to a single court, allowing other 
courts to draft in its wake.89 It would build from the internationalized 
court’s comparative strengths in legal and investigatory skills and 
 87.  Rome Statute, supra note 9, at arts. 6-8.  
 88.  Hill Moodrick-Even Khen, Revisiting Universal Jurisdiction: The 
Application of the Complementary Principle by National Courts and Implications 
for Ex-Post Justice in the Syrian Civil War, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 261, 306 
(2015) (Using Syria as an example of this phenomenon, explaining how the post-
conflict judicial system in Syria will not be able or willing to pursue criminal 
investigations and prosecutions).  
 89.  See How to Draft a Bike, WIKIHOW (Sept. 18, 2016, 12:44 PM), 
http://www.wikihow.com/Draft-on-a-Bike (explaining the concept of drafting as 
“. . . a trick where cyclists will go in single file to block the wind for the other 
people behind them . . . The second rider in a drafting line uses about 23% less 
energy than the lead rider, the third and subsequent riders use about 33% less 
energy than the lead rider.  . . . A rider in the middle of a pack can use up to 60% 
less energy than the lead rider.”). 
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resources, and it would channel the internationalized court’s efforts 
at domestic impact through its core functions: preparing for and 
holding trials. 
Certainly, internationalized criminal tribunals already produce 
lengthy opinions with thorough analysis of the relevant factual and 
legal context, so in this sense, the bellwether model would not call 
for a transformative change in practice. Instead, the court might 
undertake some small changes in practice designed to make its 
analysis more readily transferable to national courts, such as 
specifically designating in its judgments the legal and factual aspects 
that are relevant beyond the particular case before them and setting 
out the extent of that relevance. The court might also make some 
minor alterations to the structure of its judgment to place the 
common factual and legal findings in separate sections from the 
individual ones. This aspect of mass tort bellwether trials 
demonstrates the incredible utility of what international courts are 
already doing, if they select their cases with an eye to what would be 
useful to national courts, and then engage in the outreach suggested 
above in the discussion of the ECHR, so as to place that information 
in the hands of national courts. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
For internationalized courts to succeed in developing persuasive 
authority for national tribunals hearing related cases, three 
prerequisite conditions must exist. First, there must be some 
possibility of national trials; ad hoc internationalized tribunals should 
focus on situations where, although national courts are not currently 
prosecuting, they might be willing and able to do so if provided with 
incentives and assistance. National courts might, for example, be 
willing to prosecute low level perpetrators that did not pose such 
political risks for the court as high level ones. Or a national justice 
system might not have the resources to investigate large scale 
atrocities but might be able to hold trials if it could make use of the 
results of an internationalized court’s investigation. Likewise, a 
national court might not have the resources to research and analyze 
novel or complex legal issues, but might be willing to adapt the 
internationalized court’s analysis to the facts before it. In such 
situations, an internationalized court might exponentially increase its 
domestic impact by influencing trials in the national court system. 
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In addition, as suggested by some studies of international court 
influence, the political conditions must be favorable enough that 
national courts will be amenable to considering internationalized 
tribunals’ decisions. Atrocity trials often concern highly political 
issues, and so there is little hope that a tribunal’s judgments will be 
treated as apolitical. But some degree of rapprochement between the 
internationalized institution and its national counterparts will be 
necessary for an internationalized criminal court’s judgments to have 
the desired persuasive effect. 
Strict adherence to these conditions would also, however, mean 
avoiding situations in which national courts are totally unprepared or 
unwilling to prosecute, a choice which would be in tension with 
another one of international criminal law’s purposes: standing as a 
backstop against total impunity. In such instances, the international 
community and involved national actors may conclude that 
preventing absolute impunity is more important; the potential for 
facilitating national prosecutions is only one factor to be weighed 
against the other relevant concerns. But while this trade-off between 
maximizing effectiveness and preventing impunity is regrettable, I 
would argue that it is, in many instances, a worthwhile one to make 
in light of several additional considerations. First, internationalized 
tribunals will not investigate all the meritorious situations that arise 
due to their limited resources and capacity. The persuasive authority 
model does not create this problem; it is merely a proposal for 
choosing amongst the numerous situations that deserve judicial 
attention on the basis of the other relevant criteria, by focusing on 
those in which an internationalized tribunal is likely to have greater 
domestic impact. Furthermore, in situations where the national court 
system is utterly unwilling and unable to carry out any prosecutions, 
even with external support, it is unlikely that the national 
government will facilitate an international investigation and 
prosecution. Accordingly, in many cases, the complete unwillingness 
and/or inability of national courts to prosecute is likely to coincide 
with other factors indicating that international attempts at 
investigation and prosecution are likely to be stymied. Thus, 
internationalized tribunals may achieve the best domestic impact in 
states that are on the cusp of being able to address their own 
atrocities. 
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The final prerequisite is that internationalized tribunals must be 
prepared to produce their judgments in a timely fashion, before 
national courts have begun hearing their own cases. To date, 
internationalized tribunals have been acting far too slowly to 
plausibly offer persuasive authority for national courts. In order to 
serve as effective influences, future hybrid tribunals will need to act 
more efficiently. This is a difficult prerequisite to meet, because by 
their nature international criminal trials are complex, and because a 
court wishing to play a bellwether role must address the common 
factual and legal issues that are particularly resource-intensive to 
investigate and analyze. 
Once these preconditions are met, the studies of international court 
effectiveness and the U.S. bellwether trial strategy suggest several 
important design elements for future internationalized criminal 
tribunals. Certain structural elements, such as hiring expert judges, 
and communicative strategies, such as cultivating national court 
interests and ensuring the ready availability of international 
judgments, will tend to promote internationalized courts’ work as 
persuasive authority for national courts. Similarly, internationalized 
tribunals’ judgments will be more useful to their national 
counterparts if they resolve common factual and legal issues that the 
national court would otherwise have to devote great resources to 
deciding. To do so, it will be important for the internationalized 
tribunal to select representative cases and to design its judgments to 
make those findings useful to later courts. 
The lessons from these national and international models derive 
from our most basic understandings of how courts spread their 
influence. They do so not merely by compelling the parties to the 
case before them to comply, but also by persuading other courts to 
adopt their rulings and analysis, and thereby extending their 
influence throughout entire justice systems. As courts with expertise 
in investigation and legal analysis in the field of mass atrocities, 
internationalized criminal tribunals can most effectively expend their 
energies on developing the relevant facts and law. To maximize their 
persuasive authority, they should direct their activities purposefully 
at the constituency they can most readily influence through their core 
functions: post-conflict national courts. 
 
